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Abstract
This study explores a new security problem existing in various state-of-
the-art quantum private comparison (QPC) protocols, where a malicious
third-party (TP) announces fake comparison (or intermediate) results. In
this case, the participants could eventually be led to a wrong direction
and the QPC will become fraudulent. In order to resolve this problem, a
new level of trustworthiness for TP is defined and a new QPC protocol is
proposed, where a second TP is introduced to monitor the first one. Once
a TP announces a fake comparison (or intermediate) result, participants
can detect the fraud immediately. Besides, due to the introduction of
the second TP, the proposed protocol allows strangers to compare their
secrets privately, whereas the state-of-the-art QPCs require the involved
clients to know each other before running the protocol.
Keywords: Quantum cryptography; Quantum private comparison;
Third-party; Semi-honest; Almost dishonest; Individually dishonest; The
stranger environment
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1 Introduction
Quantum private comparison (QPC) is an imperative branch of secure multi-
party computing, which allows participants to determine whether their secrets
are equal or not without revealing their secrets. The first QPC protocol was
proposed by Yang et al. [1] using Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) pairs. The
security in Yang et al.’s protocol is based on the use of decoy photons in the
quantum transmission and the one-way hash function for protection the secrets
of the participants. However, since the round trip quantum transmissions are
adopted in Yang et al.’s protocol, special optical filters are required to prevent
Trojan horse attack [2–4], which decreases the qubit efficiency. Accordingly, in
order to enhance the qubit efficiency, Chen et al. [5] proposed a QPC protocol
using a triplet Greenberger-Horne-Zeilinger (GHZ) states. Since then, many
QPC protocols [6–11] have been proposed based on various quantum entan-
gled states. For example, Tseng et al. [11] proposed a QPC protocol without
any entangled EPR pairs and other QPC protocols such as in [6–10] use the
EPR pairs, GHZ states, triplet W states and the χ-type genuine four particle
entangled states for private information comparison.
The protocols described above can only compare the secrets for just two
participants. Until 2013, the first multiparty QPC protocol with GHZ state was
proposed by Chang et al. [12], in which n participants can compare whether
the private information of any two users is equal or not. Then Liu et al. [13]
proposed a multiparty QPC protocol using d-dimensional basis state. Hereafter,
many multiparty QPC protocols have been proposed. Most of them also use the
GHZ state or d-dimensional basis state. Here, our proposed protocol is based
on the GHZ state.
All the QPC protocols proposed so far require a third-party (TP) to help
the participants compare their secrets, generate photons and announce the com-
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parison (or intermediate) result. In this regard, four types of QPCs can be
categorized based on the levels of trustworthiness of the TP [14].
1. First, TP is considered as an honest agent. Since the participants can
trust TP, they just send their secrets to TP for comparison. This situation
is an ideal one, but in reality, the assumption of an honest TP is very
unrealistic.
2. Next, TP is considered as a semi-honest agent, where both participants
can trust TP partially. In this case, TP will loyally execute the proto-
col, but may try to steal participants’ secret using passive attacks. The
semi-honest TP will passively collect the classical information exchanged
between participants and try to reveal their secrets from this information.
3. Then, TP is considered as an almost dishonest agent, where both par-
ticipants can also trust TP partially. In this case, TP may try to steal the
information by modifying the procedure of the protocol actively. However,
it cannot collude with other participants. The collude behavior includes
the following cases:
(1) People works together to do something bad.
(2) A person helps the other person to avoid the detection if he/she knows
the other one is attacking.
(3) A person executes the protocol dependently with the other, which
should be independently in the protocol.
It means TP will not help any attacker steal the secrets of participants.
In other words, the TP not only can passively collect useful information
but also can actively perform any attack on the protocol except conspiring
with the participant. In some papers, this type of TP is also named as
semi-honest TP, a term easily confusing with the definition in 2.
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4. Finally, TP is considered as a dishonest agent, where both the participants
cannot trust TP. This situation is the same as the two party QPC protocol
without TP, which has been proven to be insecure by Lo et al. [15].
1.1 Problem Statement and Motivation
So far, we know that a TP plays a major role in many QPC protocols. Even
though several levels of trustworthiness of TP have been defined, many recent
QPC protocols adopt the assumption of an almost dishonest TP, which unfor-
tunately did not mention anything about whether or not the TP will always
announce a correct comparison (or intermediate) result. However, if the TP
announces a fake result, then all of above protocols will be incorrect because
the participants are not able to detect this fraud. For example, if two partic-
ipants are bidding and comparing their prices, then the TP will announce a
fake result to disturb their bidding process, even if he/she cannot obtain useful
information and benefits. Hence, it is necessary for us to define a new level of
trustworthiness for this type of TP. Here, this particular type of TP is called
“individually dishonest TP,” who could independently act maliciously. The
definition of individually dishonest TP is that the TP may announce a fake
result or try to actively steal the information by modifying the procedure of the
protocol except conspiring with participants or other TPs.
Hence, how to detect and prevent this individually dishonest TP’s malicious
behavior is a challenging problem. The entire levels of trustworthiness of TP
can also be shown in Fig. 1, where except the inner-most layer, each layer higher
automatically assumes the capability of the layer inner.
According to the above figure, the individually dishonest is more close to
dishonest and hence is more practical, where except for the conspiring attack,
the TP can perform “any” possible attack – including the denial-of-service attack
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Figure 1: Level of trustworthiness of TP
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– and the QPC protocol can still be secure.
Furthermore, this article also investigates a new environment, called the
stranger environment, where participants could be strangers. As contrary of
this scenario, the state-of-the-art QPC protocols assume the existence of au-
thentication channels or pre-sharing keys between participants in order to check
the initial state or prevent private information from leakage. The authentication
channel allows the receiver to conform the integrity of the transmitted message
and the originality of the sender, but the transmitted classical message is pub-
lic. However, sharing authentication channels or keys between the participants
requires them to establish some relationship beforehand. Can we construct a
QPC protocol for strangers who do not pre-share any key or quantum states? To
summarize our discussion, in this paper we intend to propose a new multiparty
QPC protocol with GHZ states, which is resilient to the individually dishonest
TPs in a stranger environment.
In the following, we will consider Zhang et al.’s protocol [14] as an example
to show the problems with an individually dishonest TP. Subsequently, a new
QPC protocol will be proposed with detailed security analysis.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews Zhang et
al.’s protocol and describes the problems. Section 3 gives a solution protocol
with individually dishonest TP for strangers. Section 4 analyzes the security of
the proposed protocol. Finally, a concluding remark is given in Section 5.
2 Zhang et al.’s protocol and Problems
Let Alice and Bob be two participants, who want to compare the equality of
their m-bit secret information MA and MB via the help of an almost dishonest
TP without leaking any private information to the TP or any outsider. Zhang
et al.’s protocol proceeds in the following steps:
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Step1 TP prepares m EPR pairs randomly chosen from two Bell states |φ+〉,
|ψ−〉, where |φ+〉 = 1√
2
(|00〉+ |11〉), |ψ−〉 = 1√
2
(|01〉 − |10〉). TP divides
these EPR pairs into two sequences SA and SB , representing sequences of
all the first photons and all the second photons respectively.
Step2 Step 2. TP prepares two sets of decoy photons DA and DB randomly
chosen from |0〉, |1〉, |+〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉+ |1〉), |−〉 = 1√
2
(|0〉 − |1〉). Each set
contains m qubits. TP randomly inserts DA to SA (and DB to SB) to
form a new sequence S∗A (and S
∗
B), and then sends S
∗
Aand S
∗
B to Alice and
Bob, respectively.
Step3 After Alice (Bob) receives S∗A (S
∗
B), she (he) and TP perform public
discussion to check eavesdroppers.
Step4 After the public discussion, Alice and Bob can share many Bell states
and TP is the only one who knows the initial state of these Bell states.
Then, Alice, Bob and TP work together to check the correctness of the
states.
Step5 Step 5. Alice (Bob) uses Z-basis to measure the photons in SA (SB). If
the measurement result is |0〉, then Alice (Bob) encodes it as the classical
bit ‘0’; if the measurement result is |1〉, then Alice (Bob) encodes it as the
classical bit ‘1.’ Hence, Alice (Bob) obtains a key bit string KA (KB).
Step6 Alice (Bob) calculates the comparison information CA = KA ⊕ MA
(CB = KB⊕MB), where ⊕ is a bitwise exclusive-OR operation. They also
collaborate together to compute the comparison information C = CA⊕CB
and send C to TP.
Step7 After TP gets C from Alice and Bob, TP transforms the initial Bell
state (SA, SB) into a classical bit string CT and calculates the comparison
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result R = CT ⊕C. If there is a ‘1’ in R, then TP terminates the protocol
and announces the result that the two participants’ secret information is
different. Otherwise, (i.e., if all bits in R are ‘0’), TP announces the result
that the two participants’ secret information is identical.
Within the protocol, if the TP announces a fake comparison result, then accord-
ing to Step 7, the participants cannot detect it. Hence, the participants can do
nothing but accept the wrong comparison result. Besides, in Step 4, since the
participants have to communicate with each other to check the integrity of the
almost dishonest TP so as to avoid TP’s manipulation of their communication,
they require to establish an authentication channel between them. However, in
a stranger environment, where both clients could be strangers and hence do not
share an authentication channel between them, this protocol cannot be appli-
cable. The same problems can also be found in the other state-of-the-art QPC
protocols such as in [1, 5–14].
3 The proposed scheme
A multiparty QPC protocol for strangers with two individually dishonest TPs
is proposed here. Let TP1, TP2 be two individually dishonest TPs. According
to the previous definition, the individually dishonest TPs may announce a fake
comparison (or intermediate) result to participants, though they cannot collude
with each other or with the participants. By the help of both TPs, participants
can detect whether any TP announces a wrong result. Besides, participants
involved in the protocol could be strangers, i.e., they do not need to pre-share
any secret or establish any authentication channel directly for communication
before-hand among them. In this protocol, there are quantum channels and au-
thentication channels between TPs and between each TP and each participant.
There are only classical channels between participants.
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In this section, the GHZ states used in the protocol are first reviewed in
Section 3.1. The detail description of the proposed multiparty QPC protocol is
given in Section 3.2. The usefulness of the proposed protocol in the stranger
environment is described in Section 3.3. Finally, the discussion about the mali-
cious TP will be given in Section 3.4.
3.1 The property of GHZ state
The GHZ states are as follows:
|Ψi〉 = 1√
2
(
|q1, q2, ..., qn〉+ (−1)4 |q1, q2, ..., qn〉
)
,
where i = 1, 2, 3, ..., 2n, q1 = 0, q2, q3, ..., qn ∈ {0, 1}, 4 = i − 1 (mod2) and n
denotes the number of participants.
The above state can also be re-written in X basis, {|+〉 , |−〉}, which is as
follows:
|Ψi〉 = 1√
2n−1
∑
n(−)=odd/even
(−1)δ |x1, x2, ..., xn〉 ,
where xi ∈ {+,−} satisfies the condition of n (−), the number of− in x1, x2, ..., xn.
If 4 = 0, then n (−) will be even; otherwise, if 4 = 1, then n (−) will be odd.
δ = ⊕
{i|xi=−}
.
For example, a three-qubit GHZ state |Ψ5〉 = 1√2 (|010〉+ |101〉) can be writ-
ten in X-basis as follows:
|Ψ5〉 = 1√23−1
∑
even
[
(−1)δ |x1, x2, ..., xn〉
]
= 12
[
(−1)0 |+++〉+ (−1)1⊕0 |+−−〉+ (−1)0⊕0 |−+−〉+ (−1)0⊕1 |− −+〉
]
= 12 (|+++〉 − |+−−〉+ |−+−〉 − |− −+〉) .
According to Heisenberg uncertainty principle, the measurement result of
the i−th particle could be either |qi〉 or |qi〉 with a probability of 50%. Hence,
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no one can predict the measurement result of the i−th particle. However, for
a particular GHZ state |Ψw〉, where 1 ≤ w ≤ 2n, if we measure two arbitrary
particles, e.g., the i−th particle and the j−th particle, and obtain the mea-
surement mi and mj respectively, then the xoring value mi ⊕mj is fixed. For
example, let n = 4 and w = 7, if the initial state is |Ψ7〉 = 1√2 (|0011〉+ |1100〉),
then the xoring value of first particle and second particle is always ‘0’ and the
xoring value of second particle and fourth particle is always ‘1’. Hence, if one
knows the initial state of a GHZ state, he can infer the xoring value of measure-
ment results of two arbitrarily particles. In the following, TPs will utilize this
property to do the comparison between each pair of users.
3.2 Proposed Multiparty QPC protocol
Let P1, P2, ..., Pn denote n participants, who want to compare the equality of
their m-bit secret information M1, M2, ..., Mn via the help of two individually
dishonest TPs, TP1 and TP2, without leaking any private information to the
TPs or any outsider. The proposed protocol proceeds in the following steps: (as
also described in Fig. 2)
Step1 TP1 randomly prepares 2m n-particle GHZ states as described in Section
3.1. TP1 divides these GHZ states into n sequences Si, where 1 ≤ i ≤ n,
representing sequences of all the i−th photons in these 2m initial states,
respectively.
Step2 TP1 prepares n sets of decoy photon D1, D2, ..., Dn randomly chosen
from |0〉, |1〉, |+〉, and |−〉. Each set contains 2m qubits. TP1 randomly
inserts D1 (D2, ..., Dn) into S1 (S2, ..., Sn) respectively to form the
new sequence S∗1 (S∗2 , ..., S∗n) and sends S∗i to Pi respectively. After
Pi receives S∗i , he/she and perform the public discussion to check the
existence of eavesdroppers. First, TP1 announces the positions and bases
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of decoy photons Di. Then, Pi will divide S∗i into Si and Di by the
positions and use correct basis to measure the corresponding decoy photon.
Hereafter, the participants send back the measurement results to TP1.
Finally, TP1 checks the existence of eavesdroppers by checking whether
the measurement results are correct or not. If they are correct, the protocol
can be continued. Otherwise, the protocol will be aborted. Then, TP1
sends the information of the initial GHZ states to TP2 using quantum
secure direct communication protocol, e.g., [16].
Step3 After the public discussion, P1, P2, ..., Pn can share many GHZ states
and TP1 and TP2 are the only two who know the initial states of these
GHZ states. Then, all participants and TP2 work together to check the
correctness of the states. For example, (1) P1 randomly chooses the par-
ticles for checking and announces the positions of those particles. (2) P2
randomly selects either Z-basis or X-basis for each chosen particle and an-
nounces the bases. (3) All participants use the selected bases to measure
the corresponding particles and subsequently broadcast their measure-
ment results for each chosen particle. (4) TP2 checks the measurement
results and the initial state sent from TP1 and announces whether or not
the measurement results correspond with the initial states, which should
satisfy the equations described in Section 3.1. If yes, then it implies that
there is no eavesdropper and TP1 prepares the initial state loyally and
also the information of initial state sent from TP1 is correct. Otherwise,
they abort this protocol.
Step4 Pi uses Z-basis to measure the photons in Si and obtains a key string of
measurement result Ki. That is, if the measurement result is |0〉, then P1
encodes it as the classical bit ‘0’. If the measurement result is |1〉, then P1
encodes it as the classical bit ‘1’. calculates the comparison information
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Ci = Ki ⊕Mi.
Step5 Pi sends Ci to TP1 and TP2 via authenticated channels.
Step6 After TP1 gets Ci’s from all participants, for arbitrary two participants,
Pi and Pj , TP1 calculates the comparison result Rij = Tij ⊕ Ci ⊕ Cj ,
respectively, where Tij is the expected xoring value of the i−th and j−th
particles in that particular GHZ state. If there is a ‘1’ in Rij , then TP1
announces that the secret information of Pi and Pj is different. Otherwise,
TP1 announces that the secret information of f Pi and Pj is identical.
Similarly, TP2 also does the comparison and announces the comparison
result, too.
Step7 Any two participants, Pi and Pj , can compare the Rijbetween TP1
and TP2. If the results are the same, then they believe both TP1 and
TP2 announce the correct result. Otherwise, they know that one of TPs
announce a wrong result and the entire comparison process will be aborted.
The correctness of this protocol is based on the property of GHZ state de-
scribed in Section 3.1. Since we know the xoring value, Tij = Ki ⊕Kj , of the
i−th and the j−th particles in a particular GHZ state, we can calculate that
Rij = Tij ⊕Ci⊕Cj = Tij ⊕Ki⊕Kj ⊕Mi⊕Mj = Mi⊕Mj . Hence, if all bits in
Rij are ‘0’, it means all bits in Mi and Mj are equal and the secret information
of Pi and Pj is identical.
3.3 Stranger environment
This protocol also can work on a stranger environment because the involved
users are communicating only on classical channels. In Step 3, in order to
prevent from TP1’s attacks, all participants are communicating on classical
channels, even though the communication between each user and TP2 will
12
Figure 2: Proposed multiparty QPC protocol
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eventually detect it. For example, in Step 3, P1 randomly chooses the parti-
cles for checking and announces the positions of those particles to the other
participants via classical channels. Now, if the information in the classical
channel is modified by an outsider, then the other participants will receive
wrong positions. In that case, they all measure the wrong photons except
P1. Since the measurement results may not correspond with the initial state
with a high probability, TP2 will detect this fraud. For instance, suppose
that the initial state of a particular chosen position, i (1 ≤ i ≤ m), is |Ψ1〉 =
1√
2
(|000〉+ |111〉) = 12 (|+++〉+ |+−−〉+ |−+−〉+ |− −+〉). If the cor-
rect photons in the state are measured, then the measurement result will be
|000〉 or |111〉 in Z-basis and |+++〉, |+−−〉, |−+−〉, or |− −+〉 in X-
basis. However, if the checking position has been modified by an outsider to
the other position j (1 ≤ j ≤ m) with the initial state |Ψ3〉 = 1√2 (|100〉+ |011〉)
= 12 (|+++〉+ |+−−〉+ |−+−〉+ |− −+〉), then measures the photon in i,
whereas the others will measure the photons in j. Consequently the measure-
ment result obtained by TP2 will become |100〉, |011〉, |000〉, or |111〉 in Z-basis
and |+++〉, |+−−〉, |−+−〉, |− −+〉, |−++〉, |− − −〉, |++−〉, or |+−+〉
in X-basis which will correspond to |Ψ1〉 with a probability of 50%. Hence, for
l initial states, the detection rate is 1 − (1/2)l which is close to 1 if l is large
enough.
Since there are only classical channels between participants, there may be
DOS attack in Step 3 if the classical channels are frequently disturbed. How-
ever, with a little modification, this sort of DOS attack can be prevented. The
modification is as follows. Instead of announcing the positions of the chosen
particles via classical channels, P1 informs TP2 the positions of the chosen par-
ticles via the authentication channel, and TP2 informs all the other participants
that information also via authentication channels. Similarly P2 announces the
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information via authentication channels in Step 3, too. With this modification,
no classical channel is used and hence the DOS attacker cannot be successful.
3.4 Who is telling a lie
As mentioned earlier that an individually dishonest TP could announce a fake
comparison result. However, since the other TP also does the same compar-
ison and announces the comparison result, participants will eventually detect
the inconsistency if one of the TPs is not honest. Unfortunately, the current
protocol cannot identify which TP announced the fake comparison result. To
identify the dishonest TP, an arbitrated quantum signature protocol, e.g., [17]
can be introduced to the proposed scheme with the help of a trusted arbitrator
as follows. In Step 2, instead of sending the information of the initial GHZ
states to TP2, TP1 signs the information of the initial states via an arbitrated
quantum signature for TP2 and protects the privacy of the content by using the
keys between TPs and arbitrator. Later, this information can be used by the
arbitrator to identify the TP who was telling a lie, because the arbitrator can
use the signed initial states to do the comparison and hence can identify the
dishonest TP.
4 Security Analysis
In this section, we show that our proposed protocol has several imperative se-
curity properties, which are important for a secure QPC protocol. This section
contains two parts, the outsider attack (Section 4.1), the insider attack (Section
4.2).
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4.1 Outsider attack
After TP1 sends all photons to each participant, all participants and TP1 per-
form public discussion to check outsider attack. First, TP1 announces the po-
sitions and bases of all decoy photons. Later, each participant gets the mea-
surement results by measuring the corresponding decoy photons. Then, every
participant sends back the measurement results to TP1. TP1 checks the exis-
tence of eavesdroppers by checking whether the measurement results are correct
or not.
Since the eavesdropper, Eve, does not know the positions and measurement
bases of the decoy photons, some well-known attacks such as intercept-resend
attack [18], correlation-elicitation attack [19], and entanglement-measure attack
[20] can be detected via the checking mechanism [3]. For example, if Eve mea-
sures the decoy photon |0〉 or |1〉 with Z-basis {|0〉 , |1〉}, she will pass the public
discussion. However, if Eve measures the decoy photon |0〉 or |1〉 with X-basis
{|+〉 , |−〉}, because of the quantum property, the probability that she will be
detected is 50%. Obviously, the probability that Eve chooses the wrong mea-
surement basis is 50%. Therefore, the detection rate for each decoy photons is
25% (50%×50%). For l decoy photons (where l is large enough), the detection
rate is 1 − (3/4)l which is close to 1 if l is large enough. Furthermore, since
quantum bits are transmitted only once in the proposed protocol, the Trojan
horse attack can be automatically prevented. Therefore, the proposed protocol
is free from any outsider attack.
4.2 Insider attack
In this sub-section, three cases of insider attack will be considered. The first
case discusses about the participants’ attack. The second and third cases discuss
the attack form TP1 and TP2, respectively.
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Case 1. Participants’ attack
Suppose that Alice attempts to reveal Bob’s secret. TP1 and TP2 are individ-
ually dishonest TPs who will not conspire with each other and with the par-
ticipants. In this case, if Alice tries to intercept the transmitted photon from
TP1 to Bob, she will be caught as an eavesdropper as discussed in Section 4.1.
Therefore, the only possible way for Alice to obtain Bob’s private information is
using her photon to extract Bob’s measurement result. If Alice knows the initial
state, she could calculate Bob’s measurement result by the measurement result
of Alice’s photon and the initial state. For example, suppose the initial state is
|Ψ1〉 = 1√2 (|000〉+ |111〉) = 12 (|+++〉+ |+−−〉+ |−+−〉+ |− −+〉). If the
measurement result of Alice KA is 0, then she will know the measurement result
of Bob’s KB is also 0. By knowing KB and CB , Alice can calculate the secret
information of Bob’s MB . However, since Alice does not know anything about
the initial state, it is impossible for her to perform this attack.
Case 2. TP1’s attack
In the proposed protocol, the responsibility of TP1 is to generate initial states,
inform TP2 the initial states and compare the private information. TP1 may
try to steal participants’ secrets by using fake initial states instead of the official
initial states. However, in Step 3, TP2 and all the participants work together
to check the correctness of the initial states, so if TP1 use a fake initial state,
he will be caught. For example, suppose there are three participants. TP1
generates |000〉 as the initial state and sends those particles to three participants
respectively as in Step 2, but TP1 tells TP2 a lie about the initial state as
|Ψ1〉 = 1√2 (|000〉+ |111〉) = 12 (|+++〉+ |+−−〉+ |−+−〉+ |− −+〉). All
participants use Z-basis to measure the photon and get the key bit Ki. Since
TP1 knows that the photons all participants received are |0〉, he/she will know
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the key bitsK1 for each participants is ‘0’. Then, each participant Pi sends Ci to
TP1. As the result, TP1 can easily calculate participants’ secrets Mi. However,
this attack of TP1 will be detected in Step 3, because if the participant P2
chooses X-basis to check, then the measurement results will not always be in
{|+++〉 , |+−−〉 , |−+−〉 , |− −+〉} and hence the fake initial state of TP1
will be detected.
Case 2. TP2’s attack
In the proposed protocol, the responsibility of TP2 is to check the correctness of
the initial states and compare the private information of each pair of users. TP2
may try to steal participants’ secrets by intercepting the transmitted photons
from TP1 to participants. However, TP2 will be caught in the eavesdropper
detection discussed in Section 4.1.
5 Conclusion
A new security problem about the trustworthiness of a TP, who could announce
a fake comparison result, in the state-of-the-art QPC protocols is identified,
which may cause the participants to believe in a wrong comparison result. To
explore further the problem, a new TP named individually dishonest TP, is
defined. Subsequently, a multiparty QPC protocol, which provides a solution
to detect the fake comparison (or intermediate) result announced by a TP has
been proposed. We argue that the proposed protocol can also work in a stranger
environment, where there is no authentication channel or no pre-shared key
between each pair of participants. Moreover, the proposed protocol has been
shown to be secure against both the outsider and the insider attacks.
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